

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 July 1969

The Honorable David Packard  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon

Dear Dave:

I have read Bob Froehle's tentative report on Defense intelligence with great interest. It seems to me that he has done an impressive and commendable job. In general his recommendations are compatible with views which I have held for some time and the over-all thrust of his report in the direction of greater centralization and control over Defense Department intelligence resources seems to me highly desirable.

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The details of how to implement his recommendations will obviously take some time to work out. For example, formulation of a truly consolidated Defense intelligence program, as he proposes, is a complicated matter and it may take considerable time to develop satisfactory procedures for the issuance of calls and assembling of data for such a program. Until this can be done, you may wish to continue the existing individual program presentations. I think it particularly important, at least for the time being, to continue to give independent visibility to the National Reconnaissance Program because of its importance and expense and also because our congressional committees are familiar with it.

I note that objective 4 of the report calls for a reappraisal of security policies and procedures. I have no objection to such a review but, if one is to be initiated, I would like to be associated with

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it in view of my statutory responsibility for the security of intelligence sources and methods.

The observation in the report to the effect that in practice there are fluctuations in manpower and money from approved levels seems to me particularly pertinent. A corollary of improved programming procedures for intelligence activities of the Defense Department should be the establishment of more effective controls to ensure that resource levels in fact conform to program decisions.

Two specific recommendations of the report give me concern. One is the location of the proposed Special Assistant. While I heartily concur in the need for such an Assistant, his location appears to me a matter of prime importance. Because of their sensitivity, complexity, expense and national importance, matters involving intelligence, including resource management, have heretofore normally been handled by the Deputy Secretary of Defense personally. In view of the over-all burden of responsibility on the Deputy Secretary, it seems to me desirable that he should delegate some of his responsibility in the intelligence field and certainly that he should be assisted by a trusted and competent senior official with an appropriately qualified staff.

I am extremely doubtful, however, whether this function of assisting and acting for the Deputy Secretary on intelligence matters can properly be performed by any individual, no matter how able, who is simultaneously charged with performing all the responsibilities given to any of the established Assistant Secretaries. Any existing Assistant Secretary would only be able to devote part time to intelligence matters which would have to compete for his attention with other important matters. This means inevitable delay in decision making in an area where quick reaction is essential. It also means that the actual work of developing, negotiating and coordinating positions on intelligence matters would be delegated to a subordinate staff level. Given the political significance and importance of many of the problems which determine the need for intelligence activities and the technical complexity and diversity of these activities as well as the fact that they must be responsive to a broad spectrum of officials and components of the Government, it seems to me important that their general supervision be the personal responsibility of a senior official and not delegated to a subordinate level. 25X1

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As to the location of the Special Assistant, I therefore come down very strongly in favor of Bob Froehlke's option 4.

My second concern is with the proposal to replace the Executive Committee of the NRO with an Executive Council charged with advising the Secretary of Defense on all intelligence matters. It is not clear to me how substitution of the new proposed Council would affect the administration of the National Reconnaissance Program which of course I am personally involved.

The Executive Committee of the NRO as far as I know is a unique institution in Government. It provides, in effect, a forum in which those with participating interests in the development and operation of the national reconnaissance program can meet and make speedy and reasonably informal decisions. The agreement provides that in the event of disagreement the Secretary of Defense will meet with the Executive Committee and make the final decision. This arrangement has worked very well and has given me and the intelligence community what has seemed to me an appropriate voice in the program. I do not believe that the new Council would be as satisfactory for this purpose.

What is perhaps more important, a Council with larger membership, such as the one proposed, would probably not have the flexibility and capacity for prompt action which characterizes the present Executive Committee. In addition, it is an arrangement which has been worked out through years of difficult negotiation. In view of the critical nature of the information involved and the expense of the programs, together with the strong Congressional interest in this area generally, I believe we should be most circumspect in altering an arrangement in which we have joint responsibilities without carefully measuring losses as against possible gains.

I assume that any change in the arrangements for the administration of Defense Department intelligence resources would not be intended to change the relationship which currently exists between the USIB and my office generally and the intelligence agencies and components of the Defense Department through which general guidance is provided concerning the objectives and priorities of the national intelligence effort. Both the National Reconnaissance Program and the SIGINT program of the United States are, of course, national programs.


In this connection the suggestion has been made that the Special Assistant for Intelligence would replace the Director, DIA on

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the National Intelligence Resources Board. I would welcome such an arrangement. I assume, however, that the Director, DIA would continue to represent the Defense Department on the USIB.

Sincerely,



Richard Helms  
Director

DCI/NIPE:JABROSS:ag (21/7/69)

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18 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Robert Froehlke, 18 July 1969

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

1. By arrangement, I met Mr. Froehlke in his office on 1230. He was detained a few minutes with the Secretary of Defense and I spent this time talking to Captain Cook (USN, Ret.) who has become Mr. Froehlke's deputy and who is generally familiar with the report. I asked Captain Cook whether he thought the Consolidated Intelligence Program referred to in the report would replace the CCP, NRP and CIP. Captain Cook said that he thought these three programs would be abolished. I asked him whether the new Special Assistant would issue calls to the services for the kind of data which is now contained in the CIP and CCP and how they propose to handle the rather complicated presentations of the NRP to the Executive Committee of the NRO. Captain Cook said that they had not thought this problem through particularly and thought perhaps they would not eliminate the existing programs.

2. Mr. Froehlke took me to lunch alone and said that he would like to take up any issues that I wanted to discuss in private, saying that we would later be joined by Col. Morrison who would make an official record of any points that I wanted to make.

3. I said that there were only two important specific issues. Generally speaking, I wanted to make the point, which I knew Mr. Froehlke fully understood, that the DCI had an interest in Defense Department programs which was important but difficult to define. The DCI had the responsibility for establishing the needs of the Government for information. In that connection he has the obligation to determine and advise the Secretary of Defense whether, for example, it is important to maintain facilities of some sort in

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Exactly what facilities and how many people should be committed to this assignment is largely a matter for the Secretary of Defense to determine. I pointed out that, as Mr. Froehlke knew, both the NRO and the NSA are national programs and the objectives and targets of the activities of these two organizations are determined by USIB. Mr. Froehlke said he had no quarrel with these propositions.

4. I said that the two specific concerns which we have are:

a. The proposal to vest the responsibility for managing Defense Department intelligence resources in the office of an existing Assistant Secretary; and

b. The establishment of an Advisory Council which would include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the DDI&E as members.

5. As regards the first point, I said that my only real disagreement with Froehlke's report was his statement to the effect that coordinating Defense Department intelligence activities did not justify the full time of a senior official. I said that, on the contrary, we had that there was more than enough work to do. I referred to Froehlke's own terms of reference which are extensive. If he takes on the intelligence account as well he will have to delegate to a very substantial degree. This means that intricate, sensitive and important problems would be delegated to a staff. This means substantial delays. It would also mean that an Assistant Secretary, who is supposed to act as the Deputy Secretary's advisor on intelligence matters, would not be personally familiar with all the ramifications and background of problems requiring the attention of the Deputy Secretary and other senior officials of the Pentagon. It would make for awkward relations in the NRO. It is difficult to see how the Special Assistant could function very effectively in the NRO if he is essentially at the mercy of his staff for positions on the technical issues coming before the Executive Committee.

6. As regards the proposal to have an Advisory Council, I pointed out that the Executive Committee of the NRO was established as a result of an agreement which had been negotiated over a period of three years and had resolved some very bitter quarrels between elements of the Defense Department and the community. I said that the DCI would be

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
reluctant to take any action which might be construed as an abrogation of that agreement, particularly the introductory provisions which say that the NRP "shall be responsive solely to the requirements of USIB." I said that the present Executive Committee of the NRO in effect constitutes a forum in which the three participating elements of the program (the White House, the intelligence community and the Defense Department) meet and develop a consensus. In the event of disagreement there is consultation with the Secretary of Defense, who makes the final decision on matters relating to the funding of resources. This is a somewhat different arrangement from an Advisory Council on which the DCI sits along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the DDR&E to "advise" the Secretary of Defense on intelligence resource matters.

7. As a practical matter, I pointed out that inclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a committee of this character would inevitably detract from the informality of proceedings and probably result in over-elaborate staffing and rather protracted discussion of individual military service views.

8. On the question of an Assistant Secretary versus a Special Assistant, Mr. Froehke said that he felt that an Assistant Secretary would have more authority than a Special Assistant. I said that this seemed to me to depend entirely upon the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the individual designated. A Special Assistant can act with as much or more authority than an Assistant Secretary given appropriate support. Mr. Froehke remarked that he was probably earmarked for the job and that he certainly had the confidence of the Secretary of Defense.

9. I said that an exchange of letters between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI would probably be desirable, whatever arrangements are finally approved, to restate the DCI's interest in intelligence resources of a national character and the importance which he attaches to arrangements which will be compatible with the exercise of his coordinating authority. For example, he would presumably want to reaffirm the role that USIB is supposed to play in the provision of guidance to intelligence activities, and reaffirm his interest in the National Intelligence Resources Board.

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10. As regards the NIRB, Mr. Froehlke said that he thought that the new Special Assistant should replace DIA as the Defense Department member. I said that we would welcome such an arrangement. There might be some awkwardness in the fact that the NIRB is supposed to advise the DCI on positions concerning the allocation and development of Defense Department resources which will ultimately be transmitted as guidance to the Secretary of Defense. The Special Assistant, if he is a member of the Board, would then be charged with advising the Secretary of Defense as to what to do about the recommendations, in the formulation of which he himself has participated. On balance, however, I said that I thought this would be a very good arrangement from both the DCI and SecDef point of view. On the other hand, it was recognized that DIA would continue to represent the Defense Department on the USIB.

11. After lunch we adjourned to Mr. Froehlke's office where Col. Morrison joined us for the purpose of making a record of my comments. I repeated more or less what I said at lunch about the DCI's interest in Defense Department resources and the necessity of making any arrangements for the administration of intelligence resources in the Defense Department compatible with the DCI's coordinating responsibility. I then went over the draft report commenting on the following:

a. On page 9, the agreement says "There is no arrangement for evaluating requirements in terms of objectives." I pointed out that there were arrangements which some times didn't work very well.

b. On the same page, I referred to the phrase "decisions made concerning . . . collection seldom takes cognizance of their impact on . . . processing . . ." It was agreed that this was overstated.

c. I emphasized my personal agreement with the necessity of keeping track of changes which result in substantial increases in expenditures during the course of a program year. (page 4)

d. I asked for specific illustrations of the charge that DIA is performing actions which could be undertaken by the

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military services. (page 5) The service attaches were given as an illustration.

e. In connection with objective 4, which calls for "a realistic reappraisal of security policies" (page 5) I reminded Mr. Froehlke of the DCI's statutory responsibility for security of sources and methods. Mr. Froehlke was impressed by this and said that he had never heard of this authority.

f. I asked what DoD agencies it was proposed to run under the Special Assistant. The answer was DIA, NSA and NRO.


g. I asked whether the relationship between the Special Assistant and the agency directors was a command or staff relationships. Mr. Froehlke said that he intended to have the authority to give directions and therefore it was a command relationship which he proposed to exercise very sensibly. I pointed out that direct access by the D/NRO to the Deputy Secretary of Defense is an important element in the NRO. Anything that layers the D/NRO would complicate our lives. Moreover, people with technical responsibilities like to be in a position to explain their own problem personally and directly. Therefore, I suggested that it was a mistake not to provide for direct access by agency directors to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. Froehlke said that he would change the report to provide that agency directors should have direct access providing they keep the Special Assistant informed of the subject of any discussion they have with the Deputy Secretary.

h. I asked Mr. Froehlke about the proposed DoD Intelligence Board. He said that he didn't really mean to have a Board as such. What he wanted to emphasize was the importance of regular meetings between the heads of the intelligence agencies and the Special Assistant to keep everybody informed.

i. I asked him whether his proposed directive authority over DIA would be exercised directly or via the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Froehlke said that he would do this via the JCS

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and was working out procedures with General Wheeler for direct communications in certain instances.

j. I said that the language of the next to last paragraph on page 8, to the effect that we have only sketchy estimates of what it costs to obtain information, is far too strong, pointing out that in the NRO, for example, we have rather precise measures of cost.

k. I repeated all the arguments which I had used at lunch against the vesting of the responsibility for resource management in an existing Assistant Secretary. Mr. Froehke repeated his own understanding that he would probably be given the job himself. I said that at least I would hope that the job of Special Assistant would be clearly separated and distinguished from the Assistant Secretary. At one point in our discussion of this problem, Mr. Froehke seemed to be particularly impressed with the problems which would be presented if in fact decisions and positions were actually being developed at a subordinate staff level. "We must not turn these matters over to a subordinate staff."


l. I also expressed some doubt as to whether the DCI would want to relinquish his position as a member of the Executive Committee of the NRO in exchange for membership on an Advisory Council.

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12. In conclusion, I said that I would draft a letter for the DCI's consideration to send to the Deputy Secretary of Defense commenting on the Froehke proposal and discuss it with Mr. Froehke before presenting it for signature. In this letter, I said that the DCI would reiterate his concern with the importance of continuing and strengthening the NIRB and indicating his willingness to accept the Special Assistant for Intelligence as a member of this Board.

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JOHN A. BRUSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

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